Blog Series on the Shirika Plan Part IV -The gap: Freedom of Movement.
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Despite the Shirika Plan’s commitment to socio-economic inclusion, one glaring contradiction remains: refugees are still physically confined to camps. In the final part of our series, we examine the missing piece in Kenya’s refugee strategy, freedom of movement, and why this issue may determine whether the Plan lives up to its promise or falls apart in practice.
The gap: Freedom of Movement
Freedom of movement is viewed through a national security lens. The courts have historically deferred to the government on these matters, making legal redress difficult. Meanwhile, an informal workaround persists; refugees with social capital or resources can sometimes navigate checkpoints or obtain permits, especially between Dadaab and Mombasa, but this is no substitute for a rights-based framework. The discomfort of holding refugee status in Kenya is only exacerbated by legal ambiguity. The Refugees Act does, in fact, allow individuals to opt out and live as migrants, but implementation is inconsistent. Many end up in limbo, juggling alien cards, movement passes, and other documents that are inconsistently recognised by authorities.
The Shirika Plan also purports to center host communities, with Ruto emphasising that “it recognises the indispensable role of host communities, a number of which have provided exemplary compassion, patiently and generously extending hospitality for over 35 years, and places them at the heart of this vision.”
Whilst the Shirika Plan references host communities throughout, the substance is lacking. How will frameworks like the Community Land Act inform spatial and service planning? What mechanisms exist to protect host community land rights as integration deepens? How will customary land governance systems be reconciled with formal state processes?
At the core lies the issue of meaningful participation and governance structures. For the Shirika Plan to succeed, community consultation must go beyond box-ticking and stakeholders must be represented at levels higher than the ‘technical committees’ in the decision-making hierarchy. It must engage seriously with the tensions, both between and within host and refugee communities, especially around land access and use, which is shaped by porous borders and unregistered ownership, and driven by a transnational market between Somali Kenyans, host communities, and Somalis across the border.
So, can we be sure the Shirika Plan will deliver? We can’t. As it stands, it’s a collection of vague, inconsistent, and non-committal aspirations. But that doesn’t make it meaningless. It offers a new language, a new frame, one that positions refugees as active, long-term members of society rather than temporary guests. It rejects the narrative of debt – Kenya hosting refugees out of obligation – and opens up space for African-led responses to displacement. The next three years are the Plan’s “transition stage.” The language will evolve. The strategies will be tested. Civil society must remain vigilant, track progress, push for specificity, and shape this vision from the ground up.
As the Shirika Plan moves into implementation, it faces a choice: continue managing displacement through containment and control, or embrace genuine inclusion that reflects the realities and rights of Kenya’s displaced and host populations. The stakes, both nationally and globally, are high.
